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Abstract
Suppose a series system is composed of a number of repairable components. If a component fails, it is repaired
immediately and the effectiveness of the repair may be imperfect. Then the failure process of the component
can be modelled by an imperfect failure process and the failure process of the system is the superposition
of the failure processes of all components. In the literature, there is a bulk of research on the superimposed
renewal process (SRP) for the case where the repair on each component is assumed perfect. For the case that
the component causing the system to fail is unknown and that repair on a failed component is imperfect,
however, there is little research on modelling the failure process of the system. Typically, the likelihood
functions for the superposition of imperfect failure processes cannot be given explicitly. Approximation-
based models have to be sought. This paper proposes two methods to model the failure process of a series
system in which the failure process of each component is assumed an arithmetic reduction of intensity and
an arithmetic reduction of age model, respectively. The likelihood method of parameter estimation is given.
Numerical examples and real-world data are used to illustrate the applicability of the proposed models.
Key words: Arithmetic reduction of intensity (ARI) model; arithmetic reduction of age (ARA) model;
superimposed ARI (SARI) model; superimposed ARA (SARA) model.
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1. Introduction1
In the reliability literature, repair effectiveness can be categorised into perfect, imperfect and minimal.2
Suppose an item failed. A perfect repair on the item is equivalent to replacing the item with a new identical3
item, that is, it brings the failed item to the good-as-new status; a minimal repair restores the item to the4
status just before the item failed, namely, it brings the failed item to the bad-as-old status; and an imperfect5
repair brings the item to a status between the good-as-new and bad-as-old statuses. Usually, the renewal6
process is used to model the interfailure times of perfect repairs; the non-homogeneous Poisson process is7
for those of minimal repairs; and models such as the arithmetic reduction of intensity (ARI) model and8
the arithmetic reduction of age (ARA) model are for those of imperfect repairs [1, 2, 3]. There is a bulk9
of research discussing different types of stochastic processes for modelling failure processes, or simply put,10
modelling interfailure times, see [1, 2, 3, 4], for example. These models are also applied in maintenance11
policy optimisation, see [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], for example.12
Consider a system that is composed of multiple components in series. Suppose that the failures of the13
components are statistically independent. Repair is immediately performed upon a component failure and14
the repair time is negligible. Suppose the effectiveness of the repair is not minimal.15
 If the repair is perfect, then the interfailure times of the system is a superimposed renewal process16
(SRP). The SRP has received plenty of attention from authors (see [13, 14, 15], for example). The17
reader is referred to [3] for a recently published paper of SRPs in reliability.18
 If the repair effectiveness on the failure of each component is imperfect, the superposition of the19
imperfect failure processes has not been well investigated in the literature yet.20
We refer to the case that the components that cause the system to fail are known and that interfailure21
time data are available as unmasked failure data. With unmasked failure data, if the number of failures of22
each component is large enough, one may develop a model for the failure process of each component and23
then aggregate those models to describe the failure process of the system. In the real world, nevertheless,24
maintenance data may be available in an aggregate form. That is, the interfailure time data are available,25
but which component causes the system to fail may be unknown. Such data are often referred to as masked26
failure data. In the case of modelling on masked failure data, one is unable to build a model for the failure27
process of each component and then aggregate them as there is no failure data on each individual component.28
That is, the superposition of imperfect failure processes (SIRP) cannot be explicitly given. In this case,29
methods that can approximate the SIRP have to be sought.30
Examples of such systems can be found from the real-world. For example, one can regard that a section31
of pavement is composed of a grid of cells. The section may be regarded failed if there is a large defect32
such as fatigue cracking on a cell. Maintenance should then be carried out to repair the defect and it is33
usually imperfect. But when the failure data are analysed, data on which cell causes the section to fail34
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may be unavailable due to various reasons such as a lack of precise location. For the pavement owner, it is35
important to have a model of good performance that can estimate the long term costs of maintaining the36
pavement. See [16] for other real-world examples. These examples motivate this work.37
Given a series system composed of multiple components, this paper assumes that the failure process38
of each component can be modelled with either the arithmetic reduction of intensity (ARI) model or the39
arithmetic reduction of age (ARA) model. The reason that this paper uses the ARI and ARA models40
is due to their wide coverage. Some widely studied models, including the model proposed by [17] and41
the virtual models proposed by [18, 19], are the special cases of the ARI model and the ARA model,42
respectively. This paper proposes methods to approximate the superposition of ARI (SARI) model and43
the superposition of ARA (SARA) model, respectively. Probabilistic properties of the proposed methods44
are discussed. Artificially generated numerical examples and real-world examples are used to illustrate the45
proposed methods. This paper extends the work of [4]. Its managerial implication is that practitioners may46
use the proposed methods in their work such as development of maintenance policies and life cycle costing.47
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives assumptions and notations that48
are used in the paper. Section 3 investigates the superposition of imperfect failure processes (SIRP) for49
the situations when unmasked failure data are available and then gives a method of simulating such an50
SIRP. Section 4 proposes methods to approximate the superposition of the ARI process and that of the51
ARA process for the case when only masked failure data are available, respectively. Section 5 gives the52
likelihood functions of the SARI and the SARA, respectively, and verifies the proposed methods on an53
artificially generated dataset and then on a real-world dataset. Section 6 discusses an alternative method to54
approximate the SIRP for the case when only truncated failure data are available and also gives the failure55
intensity function of the SRP. Section 7 concludes the paper and proposes future research suggestions.56
2. Assumptions and notations57
This section sets notations and assumptions.58
2.1. Notations59
The notations in Table 1 will be used in the paper.60
2.2. Assumptions61
 Suppose a series system is composed of n components, whose interfailure times are statistically inde-62
pendent.63
 The failure intensity function of component k is
1
n
λk(t) before its first failure.64
 Repair is immediately performed upon the failure of a component (or the system). The effectiveness65
of repair may be perfect, imperfect, or minimal.66
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Table 1: Notation Table
n number of components
k index of a component in the system, k = 1, 2, · · · , n
t time since the system starts, where t ≥ 0
Nt number of failures of the system up to time t
Nk,t number of failures of component k up to time t
N total number of failures of the system
i index of failures, i = 1, 2, · · · , N
m order of memory, where m ≥ 1 in the ARIm model or the ARAm model
j index of the order of memory, j = 1, 2, · · · ,∞
τ time since the completion of the latest repair, where τ > 0
bxc the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to x
bNt bNt = Nt − n× b
Nt
n
c if Nt 6= n× b
Nt
n
c, bNt = n otherwise.
TNt successive failure times of a repairable system; TNt is a random variable
Tk,Nt time to the ith failure of component k after the Ntth repair; Tk,Nt is a random variable
tNt observation of TNt
tk,Nt observation of Tk,Nt
Ht− history of the failure process up to t (exclusive of t)





λs,k(t) failure intensity function of component k if imperfect repair may be conducted upon failures
λs(t) failure intensity function of the system at time t
λas(t) approximated failure intensity function of the system at time t
hc(t) hazard function of a virtual component at time t
 The failure process of a component can be modelled by either the ARI model or the ARA model.67
 The failure process of the system can be defined equivalently by the stochastic processes {Tj}j≥1 or68
{Nt}t≥0 and is characterised by the intensity function.69
 Although the failure intensity function of an item (which may be a system or a component) should70
be denoted with the memory of Ht− such as λs,k(t|Ht−) and λs(t|Ht−). For the sake of notational71
compactness, this paper will omit the symbol Ht− and use λs,k(t) and λs(t), respectively.72
 Repair time is so short that it can be neglected.73
 Only the observations of {Tj}j≥1 or {Nt}t≥0 are available, but the source (or component) that causes74
the system to fail is unavailable. Such failure data is hereinafter referred to as masked failure data.75
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3. Modelling the failure process with unmasked failure data76
In this section, we investigate some properties of SARI and SARA, respectively, assuming that the77
components that cause the system to fail are known. That is, the failure data are unmasked.78
3.1. Related literature on failure process models for multi-component systems79
In the literature, there are several papers discussing modelling methods for multi-component systems.80
Below we give a brief review on the work published in the last two years. More references in this area can81
be found in [2, 4] and [3], respectively.82
There are many publications methods proposed to approximate the SRP (see [13, 14, 15] for example).83
The two following models, Model I and Model II, which were recently proposed in [2].84
Model I is given by,85
λs(t) = hc(t− TNt) + λ0(t), (1)86
and Model II is given by,87





λ0(t− TNt−j) + max{n−Nt, 0}λ0(t)
 , (2)88
where hc(t) is a hazard function and λ0(t) is a failure intensity function. Model I in (1) and Model II in (2)89
incorporate both time trends (ageing, reliability growth), which is modelled by the first element hc(t−TNt),90
and renewal type behaviour, which is modelled by the second element in the models, respectively.91
In essence, Model I and Model II integrate two stochastic processes, which requires more parameters92
than a single stochastic process. In reality, due to technological advances, today’s technical systems have93
a small number of failures in their service life. It is therefore difficult to collect a good number of time-to-94
failure data (or interfailure time data), based on which the estimated parameters in a failure process model95
may have large uncertainty. To reduce the number of parameters, [4] proposes the following model, which96












where ρ is a parameter and ρ ∈ [0, 1] and χ{A} = 1 if A is true, χ{A} = 0 if A is false. When ρ = 1, the above99
model reduces to a model, which is referred to as the MAI (Moving Average of Intensity) model. According100
to [4], based on the comparison among ESI and MAI, and nine other existing models on fifteen real-world101
datasets, the MAI outperforms the ten other models on eleven datasets (out of the fifteen datasets).102
Models (1), (2), and (3) are the sum of two intensity functions, which were discussed in the reliability103
literature for a different purpose, namely, for modelling bathtub shaped non-monotonic intensities. For104
example, [20] assumes the sum of two nonhomogenous Poisson processes with one intensity function being105
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the power law and the other being the log linear law, or both being the power laws [21], or both being the106
log linear laws [22].107
Models (1), (2), and (3) approximate the SRP (superposition of renewal processes) generated by a multi-108
component system, in which the repair on each component is assumed perfect. In reality, imperfect repair109
occurs from time to time and may be a more realistic measure of maintenance effectiveness. However, in110
the literature, as far as the author’s best knowledge, there is little research investigating the superposition111
of imperfect failure processes (SIRP), which motivates the work of the current paper.112
To model the failure process of a single component, reference [1] investigates several models and cate-113
gorised them into two main classes: ARIm (Arithmetic Reduction of Intensity model with memory m) and114
ARAm (Arithmetic Reduction of Age model with memory m with m ≥ 1).115




















where ρk is a parameter representing the repair effectiveness of component k and m is the order of the120
memory. That is, Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) assume that the components have different repair effectiveness (i.e.,121
ρk) and the same memory m.122
Reference [1] also discuss the cases when m = 1 and m = ∞ for the ARIm and the ARAm models as123
special cases, respectively.124
Similar to the methods to approximate the SRP proposed in [2] and [4], we may explore methods to125
approximate the failure process of a system with the failure process of each component modelled by either126
ARIm or ARAm, respectively, as shown in the following section.127
3.2. Superposition of the ARIm and ARAm processes, respectively128
Let’s first look at the failure process of a typical system, as shown in Example 1.129
Example 1. Suppose a series system composed of four components, which fail at time points shown in the130
top four horizontal lines in Figure 1. The superposition of the four imperfect failure processes is shown at131
the last horizontal line. In this example, we assume that unmasked failure data are available. If the failure132
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Figure 1: Failure data of a system with four components until time t, where N1,t = 3, N2,t = 2, N3,t = 1, and N4,t = 5
.





λ1(t)− ρ1λ1(t1,3)− ρ1(1− ρ1)λ1(t1,2)− ρ1(1− ρ1)2λ1(t1,1)134
+ λ2(t)− ρ2λ2(t2,2)− ρ2(1− ρ2)λ2(t2,1)135
+ λ3(t)− ρ3λ3(t3,1)136




Similarly, the superposition of the failure processes for the case when the failure process of each compo-139
nent is modelled by ARA3 can be easily provided.140
Now suppose that component k has Nk,t failures that have occurred within (0, t) and the latest failure141











The above model is referred to as SARIn,m (superimposed ARI) in this paper.145
Similarly, the superposition of failure processes that models the failure process of each component by146












According to [23], the ARIm model and the ARAm model have the asymptotic intensities λs,k(t) =150
1
n
(1− ρk)mλk(t) and λs,k(t) =
1
n
λk((1− ρk)mt), respectively. As such, we can obtain the following Lemma.151













Lemma 1 implies: λs(t) in Eq. (7) (or in Eq. (8)) becomes infinite for t→∞ if λk(t) is increasing in t.154
This result differs from the result of the SRP, on which [24] showed that the SRP tends toward (statistical)155
equilibrium as the time of operation becomes very large.156
3.3. Simulation157
In the SRP, each failed component in a series system is replaced with a new identical one. As reiterated158
in the preceding paragraph, [24] showed that the SRP tends toward (statistical) equilibrium as the time of159
operation becomes very large, which can be witnessed by viewing numerical examples shown in [3]. It will160
be interesting to see what trends SARIn,m and SARAn,m possess as the time of operation becomes very161
large. To this end, this subsection aims to use the Monte Carlo simulation to show their trends.162
It is noted that P (Ti+1 ≤ ti+1|Ti = ti) =
F (ti+1)− F (ti)
1− F (ti)
= 1− exp(−Λ(ti+1) + Λ(ti)).163
Suppose a series system is composed of n components, which are identical when the system start at164





The probability of the working time of a given component, component 1, for example, after the i-th167
repair is given by168
 P (T1,1 ≤ t1,1|T1,0 = 0) = 1− exp (−Λ1(t1,1)) ,169
 when the ARIm model is used, for i ≥ 1, we have170
P (T1,i+1 ≤ t1,i+1|T1,i = t1,i, · · · , T1,i−min{m−1,i−1} = t1,i−min{m−1,i−1})171
=1− exp









 when the ARAm model is used, for i ≥ 1, we have175
P (T1,i+1 ≤ t1,i+1|T1,i = t1,i, · · · , T1,i−min{m−1,i−1} = t1,i−min{m−1,i−1})176
=1− exp
−Λ1










Based on the above discussion, with the Monte Carlo simulation, we can simulate the failure process of a180














)β in the SARA model, ρ1 = 0.5, m = 2. Set the number182
n of components in a series system to be 5, 50, 100, and 200, respectively, and their numbers of failures183
are assumed to be 100×n, then the failure process according to the failure intensity function given in Eq.184
(7) and that given in Eq. (8) are shown in Fig. 2 for the SARIn,m model and Fig 3 for the SARAn,m185
model, respectively. To gain a better understanding, in Fig 3, for the different settings of n’s and the186
numbers of failures, we also show the cases for β = 1.5, 2, and 2.5, respectively, which are displayed in each187
message box. In the figures, we have divided the entire failure period into 101 units. For example, if the188







k = 0, 1, ..., 101, and show the number of failures on the Y-axis and the X-axis shows the 101 units.190
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show that the systems do not develop toward (statistical) equilibrium as the time of191
operation becomes very large. Instead, they become infinity, which agrees with Lemma 1.192
Figure 2: ρ1 = 0.5,m = 2,Λ1(t) = (t/10)
2, n and N are shown
for different curves in the figure, for the SARIn,m model.
Figure 3: ρ1 = 0.5,m = 2,Λ1(t) = (t/10)
β , n,N and β
are shown in the figure message boxes, respectively, for the
SARAn,m model.
4. Modelling the failure process with masked failure data193
If Tk,Nk,t (for k = 1, 2, . . . ) are known and we assume that λk(t) = λ(t) and ρk = ρ, from Eq. (7) and194














































Under the assumption that only masked failure data are available, unlike the SRP in which a component204
after a renewal can be regarded as starting from time 0, which implies the SRP model does not need to205
remember the component’s previous maintenance/repair history. The SARIn,m or the SARAn,m processes,206
however, must remember all of its maintenance history. If we compare the SRP with the SIRP, we can find207
 that the age of a component in the SRP is unknown as we do not know when it is installed;208
 that the number of failures of a component in the SRP is always 1 as a failed component is renewed;209
 that the operating/calendar age of a component in the SIRP is known as it is installed and started at210
time 0; and211
 that the number of failures of a component in the SIRP is unknown.212
In what follows, we assume the n components in the series system are identical. If the failure process213
of a component follows ARIm (or ARAm), then the failure processes of the others should follow the same214
model.215
Under the assumption that only masked failure data are available, the value k’s in Tk,Nk,t in Eq. (11) or216
in Eq. (4) are not observable. As such, it is not possible to use these two models shown in (11) and (4).217
Under the assumption that only masked failure data are available, we may have two approaches to218
approximating the SARIn,m process or the SARAn,m process. These two approaches are219
Approach 1 to regard the system as one single item and approximate SARIn,m and SARAn,m with ARIm220
and ARAm, respectively, or221
Approach 2 to take a further development of SARIn,m and SARAn,m, respectively, and propose new222
models to approximate these two models, respectively.223
Approach 1 uses the ARIm model and the ARAm model to approximate the series system if the failure224
data are masked. That is, in this approach, one regards a multi-component system to be a one-component225
system, then use the ARIm model or the ARAm model to model the failure process.226
When the number of failures is small, using the ARIm or the ARAm to approximate an SIRP makes the227
implicit assumption that the kth failure depends on the (k − 1)th, which may not be true for the case of228
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N < n (where N is the total number of observed failures), under which each failed component may have229
only experienced one failure, and the failures of different components are statistically independent. After230
all, the probability of the occurrences of the first failures within a short time is greater than that of the231
second failures because: within a given time period (0, t), denote P (N(t) = k) as the probability that the232
number of failures is k, then P (N(t) = 2) < P (N(t) = 1).233
Although the numbers of component failures in a typical system may be different, as shown in Fig 4,234
the expected numbers of failures for identical components in a given time period are the same. As such, a235
naive but appealing approach to approximating the SIRP model is to assume that the failures of the system236
are caused by each component one after another. That is, suppose a system that is composed of identical237
components in series, we assume the first n failures are due to the first failures of the n components, the238
failures from the (n+ 1)-th to the 2n-th failures are due to the second failures of the n failures, and so on.239
















where bxc is the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to x.243
Then we have the following analyses.244
(i) The case of the ARI model. If we assume that the failure process of each component follows ARIm245
shown in Eq. (4), we have the following analyses.246
 If Nt = 0, the failure intensity of the system is λ(t).247



























 If n < Nt ≤ mn, there are the two following scenarios.255
– If Nt = nb
Nt
n












– If Nt 6= nb
Nt
n
c, then bNt components have experienced one more failure than the n − bNt258











ρ(1− ρ)jλ(TNt−nj−k+1), and the sum of the failure intensity function of260



































 Similar to the case of n < Nt ≤ mn, if Nt > mn, then we have265
– If Nt = nb
Nt
n









– If Nt 6= nb
Nt
n



















(ii) The case of the ARA model. If we assume that the failure process of each component follows271
ARAm shown in Eq. (5), we have the following analyses.272
 If Nt = 0, the failure intensity of the system is λ(t).273




λ(t−ρTk) and each of the rest n−Nt components has failure intensity275
1
n











 If Nt > n, a similar discussion as the ARI case can be made.279
To sum up, we obtain the following definition, i.e., Definition 1.280
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Definition 1. A new SARIn,m model, denoted as SARI
a
n,m, and a new SARAn,m, denoted as SARA
a
n,m are281
defined, respectively, in the following. A SARIan,m is defined by282
λas(t) =




















ρ(1 − ρ)jλ(TNt−n(j−1)−bNt−k+1) if Nt ≥ n
(20)283
and a SARAan,m is defined by284
λas(t) =






λ (t− ρTk) +
n−Nt
n

















 if Nt ≥ n
(21)285
286
On Definition 1, there are the following special cases.287
(i) If n = 1, then SARIan,m in Eq. (20) and SARA
a
n,m in Eq. (21) reduce to ARIm and ARAm in (4) and288
(5), respectively.289
(ii) If m = 1 and Nt > n, then SARI
a













λ (t− ρTNt−k+1) . (23)293
(iii) If ρ = 0, then the repair on each component is minimal and both SARIan,m in Eq. (20) and SARA
a
n,m294
in Eq. (21) reduce the NHPP (non-homogenous Poisson process).295
(iv) If ρ = 1 and n = 1, then296
 The failure intensity λas(t) after the Ntth failure in SARI1,m (see Eq. (20)) is λ(t) − λ(TNt). At297
time TNt , λ(t) − λ(TNt) = 0 and the system starts from the status with failure intensity 0. But298
it is important to note that it does not mean that the item is repaired as good as new.299
 The failure intensity λas(t) after the Ntth failure in the SARA1,m model (see Eq. (21)) is λ(t−TNt).300
At time TNt , λ(t− TNt) = 0, which implies that the system is repaired as good as new.301
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λ (t− TNt−k+1) , (25)305
respectively.306
The model shown in Eq. (25) is the MAI model, which is a special case of the model shown in Eq.307
(3).308
Remark 1. The above bullet (v) shows that the MAI model is a special case of the SARAan,m model.309
Numerical data experiments and case studies show that the MAI model has a clear advantage over ten other310
models on 11 out of 15 real world datasets [4]. As such, the model SARAan,m can be regarded as an extension311
of the MAI model.312
Remark 2. The existing failure process models can roughly be categorised into three classes, as discussed313
below.314
 Models that have one parameter depicting the repair effectiveness of each individual repair. For exam-315
ple, the parameter An in the virtual age models Vn = Vn−1 +An(Tn−Tn−1) and Vn = An(Vn−1 +Tn−316
Tn−1) is the parameter depicting the effectiveness of the nth repair [25] (where Vn is the virtual age).317
Technically, An may estimate the repair effectiveness of different components in a system. However,318
in reality, it is not suitable for modelling the failure process of a multi-component system due to two319
reasons: on the one hand, the size of masked failure data may not be sufficiently large for estimating a320
large number of parameters An; on the other hand, An may be assumed a stochastic process, on which321
there is little research that has been conducted.322
 Models that have only one parameter depicting the repair effectiveness for different components in323
a system. For example, models shown in Eq. (4) and (5) fall in this category. Similarly, if An324
in the virtual age models are set to An = A (i.e., An are the same over different n’s), then the325
above-mentioned virtual age models have one parameter as well. The shortcoming of such models for326
modelling the failure process of a multi-component system is discussed in Approach 1 in the above327
discussion.328
 Models that approximates the SRP. For example, models shown in Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) fall in this329
category, which assumes that the repair on each failed component is perfect and is not suitable for a330
system in which repair on failed component is imperfect.331
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Models (20) and (21) are derived for depicting the failure process of a multi-component series system when332
the failure process of a component follows the ARI model and the ARA model, respectively. They can333
therefore be used to model the failure process of the pavement system discussed in Section 1, for example.334
Figure 4: Masked failure data of a system with four components until time t, where N1,t, N2,t, N3,t, and N4,t are unknown;
Nt = 11. where ti,0 = 0, j = 1, 2, ..., Ni,t, and tj = 0 if j ≤ 0.
Example 2. Suppose that the value k’s in Tk,j in Example 1 are unknown. But tj (j = 1, 2, ..., 11) are335
available, as shown in Figure 4. We assume that the four components are identical and that the failure336
process of each component is ARI3. The 11 failures are assumed to be caused by three failures of each of337
three components and two failures of the other component (3×3+2 = 11), respectively, which can be modelled338




ρ(λ(t11) + λ(t10) + λ(t9))340
− 1
4
ρ(1− ρ)(λ(t8) + λ(t7) + λ(t6) + λ(t5))341
− 1
4
ρ(1− ρ)2(λ(t4) + λ(t3) + λ(t2) + λ(t1)). (26)342
343




ρ(λ(t1,3) + λ(t4,5) + λ(t4,4))345
− 1
4
ρ(1− ρ)(λ(t2,2) + λ(t4,3) + λ(t4,2) + λ(t1,2))346
− 1
4
ρ(1− ρ)2(λ(t3,1) + λ(t2,1) + λ(t4,1) + λ(t1,1)). (27)347
348
As can be seen, Model (27) differs from Model (6).349
In the following, we compare λs(t) in Eq. (7) with λ
a
s(t) in Eq. (20), and λs(t) in (8) with λ
a
s(t) in (21).350
To do it, we need to introduce an important definition on stochastic ordering.351
Definition 2. Stochastic order (p. 404 in [26]). Assume that X and Y are two random variables. If for352
every real number r, the inequality353
P (X ≥ r) ≥ P (Y ≥ r)354
15
holds, then X is stochastically greater than or equal to Y , or X ≥st Y . Equivalently, Y is stochastically less355
than or equal to X, or Y ≤st X, or, E(X) ≥ E(Y ).356
Suppose a system is composed of n identical components, each of which follows the same ARIm, then357


























































The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix.369
εt measures the difference between λs(t) and λ
a
s(t). It should be noted: εt has a practical implication if370
the values of ρ’s in Eq. (11) and in Eq. (20) are the same and the λ(t) in model (20), which is obtained371
from the masked failure data, and the λ(t) in model (11), which is obtained from the unmasked failure data372
are the same.373
5. Parameter estimation and numerical examples374
In this section, we derive the maximum likelihood functions for the models proposed in Section 4 and375
then apply them on a real dataset.376
Given a series of successive failure times t1, t2, · · · , tN , on which the system failed; where N is the number377
of failures and N > n. That is, the available data are up to the time at which the last failure occurs.378
5.1. Maximum likelihood functions379
Below we consider the likelihood for the failure process of a single system before a specified number of380
failures is occurred. If several independent processes are observed, the log-likelihood can be easily obtained381
based on the likelihood functions given in this section.382
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Below we will give the likelihood function of the SARIan,m model and the SARAn,m models in Section383
3. The derivation of the likelihood functions follows from Andersen et al. (1993, sec. II.7) that under our384
stated conditions, the likelihood function for the observations from a single system is derived below.385
Following the definition of bNt , we define bi = i−nb
i
n
c if i 6= nb i
n
c, where i is a positive integer. We also386
define N1 = {i|1 ≤ i ≤ n−1}, N2 = {i|n < i ≤ N−1, i 6= νn, 1 ≤ ν < b
N
n































































































and the likelihood of the SARAan,m model is given by397




























































































































By maximising log(LSARI) and log(LSARA), one can find optimal parameters in λ(t) and ρ̂, respectively.407
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5.2. Data examples408





We use criteria such AIC (Akaike information criterion), AICc (AIC with a correction), and BIC (Bayesian410
information criterion) to compare the performance. Those criteria are: AIC = −2 log(L) + 2q, AICc =411
−2 log(L) + 2q + 2(q + 2)(q + 3)
N − q − 2
, and BIC = −2 log(L) + qlog(N), where L is the maximized value of412
the likelihood for the model, q is the number of parameters in the model, and N is the total number of413
failures (observations). The term 2q,
2(q + 2)(q + 3)
N − q − 2
, and qlog(N) in the AIC, AICc and BIC penalise a414
model with a large number of parameters, respectively. The reader is referred to [27] for details on model415
performance measures. [28] provides a practical procedure for the selection of time-to-failure models based416
on the assessment of trends in maintenance data.417
We compare the performance of the proposed models SARIan,m and SARA
a
n,m on artificially generated418
data, which are generated based on the simulation method shown in Section 3.3. We set failure intensity419
function λ(t) = 0.002869t1.5 (which has Λ(t) = (
t
15
)2.5), n = 3, m = 2, and ρ = 0.5, that is, each of the three420
components has a failure process ARI2. We compare the models: NHPP, ESI, MAI, ARI, ARA, SARI
a
n,m,421
and SARAan,m on the dataset. Table 2 shows that the SARI3,7 outperforms other models in terms of the422
−log(likelihood).423
Table 2: Model comparison on artificially generated data.
NHPP ESI MAI ARI ARA SARI SARA
SARI Data −log-likelihood 85.78 85.14 85.13 84.10 84.14 84.09 84.12
(α = 15, β = 2.5 BIC 179.38 182.01 178.09 179.94 180.01 179.92 179.97
n = 3, N = 50) AICc 176.08 177.16 174.79 175.09 175.16 175.07 175.12
We also compare the performance of the proposed models SARIan,m and SARA
a
n,m on the Bus514 dataset424
shown in [29]. On this dataset, we know neither the number of components nor whether the components are425
identical. We compare the models: NHPP, ESI, MAI, ARI, ARA, SARIan,m, and SARA
a
n,m on the dataset.426
Table 3 shows that the SARIa3,1 outperforms other models.
Table 3: Model comparison on the Bus514 dataset.
NHPP ESI MAI ARI ARA SARI SARA
-log-likelihood 532.74 530.82 533.18 530.84 532.74 530.38 532.74
Bus514 Data BIC 1073.46 1073.61 1074.34 1073.65 1077.45 1072.73 1077.45
AICc 1069.96 1068.46 1070.84 1068.50 1072.30 1067.58 1072.30
427
The above two examples show that SARIan,m results in the smallest −log(likelihood values), but SARAan,m428
does not perform so well as the SARIan,m model. Nevertheless, since the MAI model shows its outstanding429
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performance and SARAan,m is an extension of MAI, one may set ρ = 1 in SARI
a
n,m in case SARA
a
n,m shows430
poor performance on a dataset. To gain a better view on the comparison of the performance of the models,431
Figure 5 shows their values of BIC and AICc.
Figure 5: Comparison of BIC and AICc.
432
6. Discussion433
6.1. An approximation method for left-truncated masked failure data434
Section 4 discusses the scenario where a full history of masked failure data can be collected. Now we435
consider the case that M failure observations of the earliest occurrences are not available, that is, T1, ..., TM436
are not available, but TM+1, TM+2, . . . , TNt are available. Such data are masked left-truncated failure data.437
One can the models SARIan,m and SARA
a
n,m in Section 4 to fit the data, which assumes that the first n failures438
are due to the n components, respectively. An alternative method is to simply take TNt , TNt−1, ..., TNt−n+1439
as the last failure times of the n components, and take TNt−n, TNt−1, ..., TNt−2n+1 as the 2nd last failure440
times of the n components, and so on. Under such an assumption, we propose the following models.441






















































where m ≥ 1, N ′t = Nt −M + 1, ΦN ′t = χ{N
′
t ≥ n}, ΨN ′t = χ{b
N ′t
n






N ′t 6= nb
N ′t
n
c, and rt = N ′t otherwise.447
Definition 3 differs from Definition 1, as shown in Figure 6 and Example 3448
 Fig. 6 shows the difference between the two definitions. The notes above the SIRP line shows how Definition449
1 defines a cycle, which is a set of Tk with the same power of (1 − ρ) in a SARIan,m model or in a SARAan,m450
model, and the notes under the SIRP line shows how Definition 3 defines a cycle.451
 Eq. (34) in Example 3 shows the SARIa4,3 by Definition 3, in which λ(t8) has a coefficient
1
4




ρ(1− ρ) whereas in Example 2, λ(t8) has a coefficient
1
4




Figure 6: Comparison of definitions of different cycles of Definition 1 and Definition 2.




ρ(λ(t11) + λ(t10) + λ(t9) + λ(t8))
− 1
4
ρ(1− ρ)(λ(t7) + λ(t6) + λ(t5) + λ(t4))
− 1
4
ρ(1− ρ)2(λ(t3) + λ(t2) + λ(t1)). (34)
6.2. Failure intensity function of the SRP454
Although the SRP has been well studied (see [3] for more detailed discussion), to the author’s best knowledge, its455
failure intensity function has not been given in the existing literature and is given in Lemma 3.456
Lemma 3. Given a series system on which a failed component is replaced with an identical new component immedi-457















λin(t− Tin,Nt), if Nt ≥ 1.
(35)459
where jk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nt}, ik ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, T0 = 0, ik1 6= ik2 for k1 6= k2, jk1 6= jk2 if k1 6= k2 and jk1jk2 > 0.460
The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix.461
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7. Conclusions and further work462
In the real world, systems are normally composed of multiple components and the failure data may be masked463
due to insufficient failure cause data or such data are unattainable because of physical constraints or lack of resources.464
This needs to develop a method to model the superposition of a number of imperfect failure processes. However,465
since the failure data are masked, the components that cause the system to fail are unknown. This needs to develop466
methods to approximate the failure process of the system.467
While the superposition of renewal processes has been extensively studied, the superposition of imperfect failure468
processes (SIRP) has received little attention in the literature. There is a need to conduct research on SIRP, which is469
the focus of this paper.470
The main contributions of this paper include the following.471
 This paper developed two methods: one for untruncated masked failure data and one for left-truncated data, to472
approximate the superposition of the imperfect failure processes of the components in a series system in which473
the failure process of each component follows two widely used models. The imperfect failure process models are474
the arithmetic reduction of intensity (ARI) model or the arithmetic reduction of age (ARA) model, respectively.475
 The paper showed that unlike the superposition of renewal processes, the superposition of the ARI processes476
(SARI) (or the ARA processes (SARA)) does not tend toward (statistical) equilibrium as the time of operation477
becomes very large;478
 The MAI (Moving Average of Intensity) model proposed in [4] is a special case of the superposition of the ARA479
processes; and480
 It developed a method to simulate the SARI process and the SARA process, respectively, and gave likelihood481
functions of the SARI model and the SARA model (for the untruncated data), respectively.482
Our future work will be focused on the derivation of statistical properties of the models.483
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Appendix543
Below gives the proof of Lemma 2.544







































ρ)jλ(TNt−n(j−1)−bNt−k+1). Note that Tk,Nk,t−j ≥st T1, TNt−k+1 ≥st T1, and TNt−n(j−1)−bNt−k+1 ≥st T1. According547
to Definition 2, we have E(Tk,Nk,t−j) ≥ E(T1), E(TNt−k+1) ≥ E(T1), and E(TNt−n(j−1)−bNt−k+1) ≥ E(T1). We can548










Below gives the proof of Lemma 3.553
Proof. The condition jk1 6= jk2 if k1 6= k2 and jk1jk2 > 0 implies that (1) there is one component renewed, which554
has failure rate function λin(t−Tin,Nt); and (2) within the others, some may have not renewed since installation time555
t = 0 and have the same age, and the others may have failed and then renewed at different failure times.556
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During the period from the first replacement until the time when the last component installed at time t = 0 is replaced.558
559
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